Dolan Versus Secretary of State, Compulsory Vaccination for Covid-19 and Human Rights Law
Updated: Nov 16
The ramifications of Simon Dolan's court case against the government - thrown out of the High Court in July (and now at The Court of Appeal) - sets a dangerous legal precedent, which lawyers on a Parliamentary Committee may be using to pronounce mandatory vaccinations lawful.
When we examine the written evidence from Lawyers: Dr Lisa Forsberg, Dr Isra Black, Dr Thomas Douglas and Dr Jonathan Pugh on the Parliamentary Committee, the following devil is in the detail:
"Some uncertainty regarding the compatibility of 'lockdown' with human rights law has been resolved by the recent administrative court case 'Dolan Versus Secretary of State'"
"The Dolan decision does not deny that the lockdown engages the European Court for Human Rights, contained in article 5, 8 and 11. Rather interference with these rights is justified because of the potential human rights impact of COVID-19"
"Our analysis -
a). If Covid-19 ‘lockdown’ measures are compatible with human rights law, then it is arguable that compulsory vaccination is too (lockdown parity argument);
b). If compulsory medical treatment under mental health law for personal and public protection purposes is compatible with human rights law, then it is arguable that
compulsory vaccination is too (mental health parity argument)."
This is an important case for the opposition, and if the case is indeed being leveraged by the government for mandating vaccinations, it raises serious questions. This should be about victory for the people and not for the state.
If the case fails then it’s imperative that another, independent legal challenge be made, otherwise an important legal benchmark will be established.
I will conclude with another deeply alarming quote from the Parliamentary Committee:
"it should include exclusions for individuals in whom vaccination is likely to be unsafe or ineffective. In order to minimise restrictions on liberty, it might also include an exclusion for individuals who are willing to lower their infection and transmission risk through other means, for example, through submitting to ‘lockdown’ and other mitigation measures. The thought here is that for any one individual, either compulsory vaccination or other restrictions on liberty may be consistent with human rights law, but not both, that is, should an individual opt for restrictions on liberty, it may be hard to justify compulsory vaccination"